Abstract: In many languages, adjectives agree with a noun phrase in number and gender, but not in person. In others, ditransitive verbs can agree with their theme argument in number and gender, but not in person (the Person Case Constraint). However, a unified account of these two similar patterns has rarely been attempted. In this article, I review how a single syntactic principle from Baker 2008-the Structural Condition on Person Agreement (SCOPA)-can explain both phenomena, in contrast to other existing proposals. I then go on to show how the SCOPA also accounts for five other environments in which verbs agree in number and gender (if relevant) but not in person. Special attention is given to two entirely new cases: subject raising constructions in Sakha and agreement with direct objects in Ostyak. Along the way, I also discuss the consequences of partial agreement for case assignment, using this to explain why non-SCOPA-compliant configurations sometimes result in legitimate partial agreement with a first or second person pronoun, and sometimes result in a structure being ineffable.
Introduction: some situations in which agreement is limited
Agreement is a fascinating topic, in part because it involves many different factors: syntax, morphology, semantics, and pragmatics all come into play, as well as issues about how all of these are processed in real time. Teasing out which observable phenomena are to be attributed to which of these factors is a challenging task. If all goes well, the study of agreement, though difficult, should offer the rewards of teaching us something about the natures of these different aspects of grammatical description and how they interact.
Despite the many works on agreement in the syntax literature, a case can still be made that the role of pure syntax in explaining some of the interesting asymmetries of agreement is underappreciated. For example, there are various situations in various languages in which a given category can agree with a nearby nominal in number and gender (if the language has a grammatical gender system), but not in person. These situations have generally been treated in piecemeal fashion, often by making lexical or morphological stipulations of one sort or another. For example, double object constructions sometimes manifest what I call the two-and-a-half agreement effect (a special case of the so-called Person-Case Constraint (PCC); see below). In some languages, ditransitive verbs display full person-number-gender agreement with the subject, equally full person-number-gender agreement with the goal object, but (at most) reduced, partial agreement with the theme object. The following is an example from classical Nahuatl: 1 1 Most agreement morphemes are glossed with a complex symbol constructed out of a subset of the following three elements: an Arabic number expressing the person of the agreed-with nominal (1, 2, or 3), a lower case letter expressing the number of the agreed with nominal (s singular, d dual, or p plural), and an upper case letter expressing the grammatical function of the agreed with nominal (S subject, O object, P possessor). Other abbreviations in the glosses of examples include: A, B, C, Southern Tiwa number-noun class combinations; ACC, accusative case; AOR, aorist; AUX, auxiliary; CL1, CL2, CL4, Swahili noun classes; COND, conditional mood; DAT, dative case; F, feminine gender; FUT, future tense; GER, gerund; IMP, imperative; IMPF, imperfective aspect; INF, infinitive; INST, instrumental case; LAT, lative case (Ostyak); LOC, locative case; M, masculine gender; NEG, negative; NOM, nominative case; NOML, nominalizer; PASS, passive; PAST, past tense; PL, plural; POST, postposition; PRES, present (1) Xi-nēch-im-maca huēhuèxōlô. Nahuatl (Launey 1981 :174) 2sS.IMP-1sO-PL-give turkeys 'Give me some turkeys.' (Not: 'Give me to some turkeys.') But this is by no means the only place that partial agreement is systematically found in the grammars of natural languages. Another familiar context is agreement on predicate adjectives. In many languages, these can agree with the subject of predication in number and gender, but in most languages they cannot agree with the subject in person. (2) illustrates this for Spanish:
(2) (Nosotras) somos gord-as. (*gord-amos) (Spanish) we.F.PL are.1pS fat-F.PL fat-1p 'We are fat.' I consider it striking that ditransitive constructions and adjectival constructions draw the same distinction among the phi-features: both are contexts in which a given head can agree with a certain nominal in number and gender but not in person. The question that I focus on in this article is whether it a coincidence that these two kinds of partial agreement divide the set of phifeatures in exactly the same way.
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As far as I know, all previous theories implicitly suggest that the answer is yes, in that they have not even attempted a unified account of the two phenomena. The PCC has been explained syntactically or perhaps morphologically, often as a constraint on how the verb can agree with a lower object (the theme) when a higher object (the goal) intervenes between it and the agreeing category (Anagnostopoulou 2003 , Anagnostopoulou 2005 , Nevins 2007 , Rezac 2008 . Such approaches cannot readily extend to the adjectival construction in (2), because there is only one NP in the structure, hence no interference between two possible agreement triggers is expected. In contrast, adjectival agreement has often been treated lexically or morphologically. It is commonly assumed that adjectives are specified as having slots for some features but not others; they are "phi-incomplete" in the terms of Chomsky (2000 Chomsky ( , 2001 . But this approach is not very explanatory, and it does not do justice to the crosslinguistic robustness of the phenomena (see Baker 2008 for discussion). Alternatively, Wechsler and Zlatić (2003) divide the phi-features into two groups, the concord features and the index features, and stipulate that adjectives access the first group and verbs the second. This account has no obvious way of extending to the PCC cases, because there is no obvious reason why verbs can access the person feature (part of the index feature bundle) when agreeing with their subject but not when agreeing with their theme object.
In contrast, I do claim that a single syntactic theory of agreement can explain the two phenomena in a unified way. In particular, I argued in Baker 2008 that agreement in person tense; PRT, particle; SG, singular. The original sources should be consulted for more detail about what these categories are than can be given here. 2 One does occasionally find other distinctions drawn among the phi-features when it comes to agreement. For example, there is the well-known case of Standard Arabic, in which the verb in a clause with SVO order agrees with the subject in person, number, and gender, but the verb in a clause with VSO agrees with the subject in gender only (Fassi Ferhi 1993 , Benmamoun 2000 , among many others). The fact that postverbal subjects cannot agree in person could be a reflex of the SCOPA, given that they have not moved to Spec, TP and hence have not merged with a projection of T (assuming that to be the agreement bearing category). But the SCOPA does not explain why postverbal subjects agree in gender but not number in Arabic. I tentatively assume that this is a purely morphological phenomenon, analyzed along the lines discussed by Benmamoun 2000. requires a more specific syntactic configuration than agreement in number and gender does. I stated the relevant condition as follows:
(3)
The Structural Condition on Person Agreement (SCOPA) A category F can bear the features +1 or +2 if and only if a projection of F merges with a phrase that has that feature and F is taken as the label of the resulting phrase.
Under plausible, independently motivated assumptions, the goal object can move to Spec vP, but the theme object cannot; nor can the subject of an adjectival predication move downward into AP. Given these structural assumptions (presented more fully below), agreement in person is ruled out for the theme object of a ditransitive verb and for the subject of an adjective by the very same principle.
In this article, I begin by reviewing the account of Baker 2008 in more detail (section 2). I then go on to demonstrate what I take to be the single greatest advantage of this syntax-oriented approach: it extends readily to additional situations in which agreement is possible in number and gender, but not in person. In Baker 2008:ch 3, I discussed three further cases: T agreeing partially with a wh-phrase in Spec, CP in nonstandard English, T agreeing partially with nominative objects in oblique subject constructions in Icelandic and certain other languages, and T (or v) agreeing 'long distance' with an NP that remains inside an embedded clause in (for example) Lokạạ. These accounts are reviewed briefly in section 2.3. Then, in the last two sections of this article, I expand on this empirical base, testing and developing my theory by exposing it to data from two completely new constructions in two languages spoken in Siberia: Sakha (Turkic, section 3) and Northern Ostyak (Finno-Ugric, section 4). In Sakha, Tense can show partial agreement with the subject of a clause if and only if that subject raises from an embedded clause so that it is assigned accusative case in the matrix clause. Thus, there can be agreement in number only on the verb of the embedded clause in (4b), but not in (4a).
(4) a. Min [bügün ehigi kyaj-yax-xyt/*tara dien] erem-mit-im. I today you.NOM win-FUT-2pS/3pS that hope-PAST-1sS
3 Of course, the SCOPA does not look like a very plausible fundamental principle of grammar. One would thus like to know from what more fundamental principle(s) it derives. In Baker 2008:ch. 4, I seek to derive the SCOPA from a more general principle that defines what it is to be first or second person, which applies to pronouns as well as to agreeing heads. However, that line of argument is complex, a bit delicate, and irrelevant to the concerns of this article, so I do not review it here. As the guest editorial team points out, there is a strong similarity between the SCOPA and the conception of agreement developed independently in Franck et al. (2006) . Franck et al. suggest that there are two distinct agreement processes in natural languages, Agree in the sense of Chomsky (2000 Chomsky ( , 2001 and Spec-head agreement. Spec-head agreement applies after Agree has already taken place, and serves to strengthen and reinforce agreement between the functional head and the relevant NP. As a result, Agree at a distance is more fragile, more variable across languages, and may be impoverished in terms of the phi-features it expresses when compared to Spec-head agreement. My proposal can be seen as a refinement of Franck et al.'s general view, making the stronger claim that agreement for first and second person can never take place under mere Agree. (Another, rather minor difference in the two views is that Franck et al. relate stronger/richer agreement to Spec-Head agreement, whereas I relate it more generally to Merge applying between the NP and the agreeing functional head. My formulation thus allows rich agreement (i.e., agreement in person) between an adposition or quantifier and its NP/DP complement, as is indeed attested in various languages (Baker 2008:112-16 ).) 'I hoped that you would win today.' (Vinokurova 2005:361) b. Min [ehigi-ni [bügün kyaj-yax-tara] dien] erem-mit-im. I you-ACC today win-FUT-3pS that hope-PAST-1sS I hoped (of you) that you would win today. (Vinokurova 2005:361) In Northern Ostyak the verb shows number agreement but not person agreement even with a single object (Nikolaeva 1999 , Nikolaeva 2001 ):
(5) a. Ma tăm kălaŋ wel-sə-l-am. I this reindeer kill-PAST-pO-1sS 'I killed these reindeer.' b. Xŭnśi năŋ mŭŋ-iluw xălśa want-lə-l-an?
when you we-ACC where see-PRES-pO-2sS 'When did you see us where?'
My goal, then, is to show that a syntactic account built around the SCOPA extends to these two new patterns as well. Once this is established, my charge of inadequate generality against theories that treat the various instances of partial agreement in disparate ways becomes that much more serious, and my claim that this class of phenomenon is due to the syntax of agreement becomes that much stronger. Adding examples like (4) and (5) to the picture also makes it possible to recognize the role of a new principle, which I adopt from Rezac 2008, concerning how partial agreement interacts with case assignment. This principle can be used to explain why sometimes partial agreement with a first or second person pronoun is tolerated by the grammar, whereas in other cases it leads to ineffability. It thus fills in an important lacuna in the theory of Baker 2008. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
A unified syntactic account
Our first task is to become more familiar with the SCOPA, and to see how it provides a unified account of why agreement can only be partial on predicate adjectives and with the theme argument of a ditransitive construction.
Partial agreement on predicate adjectives
It is a familiar fact that predicate adjectives in many languages can agree with the subject of predication in number and gender but not person, even though verbal predicates in the same language might well show agreement in person as well as number. 4 For example, (6a) and (6b) show that the predicate adjective changes to reflect the number and gender features of its subject in Spanish. However, the agreeing form of the adjective in (6c) is the same as the form used in (6a), despite the fact that the person of the subject is different. Indeed, this pattern can be found in languages from all around the world (Baker 2008:ch.1) .
In Baker 2003 , I argued at length that adjectival predications across languages are built up out of the basic substructure shown in (8). What is crucial here is that the subject of the predication is not generated inside AP; rather it is base-generated as the specifier of a special copular category, Pred. This head Pred has the semantic function of unlocking a thematic role implicit in the meaning of the AP (if any), so that that role can be assigned to a subject. (It is the "up" operator of Chierchia and Turner 1988; see Bowers 1993.) This proposal was originally made to explain certain syntactic differences between adjectives and intransitive verbs-especially the fact that some intransitive verbs behave like unaccusative predicates, whereas thematically similar adjectives do not with respect to phenomena like ne-cliticization (Italian), possessor raising (Hebrew, Sakha), genitive of negation (Russian), and noun incorporation (Mohawk, Wichita, Sakha, etc Unlike adjectives, verbs in Spanish and Swahili can agree fully with a first or second person subject. This difference has two sources. First, verbs are actual predicates, not just potential predicates: they can theta-mark a subject generated inside VP directly, without the mediation of an extra head like Pred. Second, verbs often combine with a distinct functional head, Tense, which is the true bearer of agreement in the syntax. Given this, it is legitimate (and often required) for the subject to move out of VP and merge with a projection of T, as in (9b). (9) a. Nosotras ca-er-emos.
(Spanish) we.F.PL fall-FUT-1pS 'We will fall.' b.
Agreement in person as well as number and gender is thus allowed on T by the SCOPA. This agreement surfaces on the verb when T combines with the verb morphologically, as a result of either head movement in the syntax, or the fusion of adjacent heads at PF.
The simple statement that adjectives do not agree in person is not true universally. A small but significant number of languages do allow person agreement on predicate adjectives as 5 More technically, Baker 2008 assumes that the bearer of "adjectival" agreement is F A , a functional head generated immediately above AP. This detail does not affect the line of reasoning sketched, and need not concern us here.
Cinque 1990 shows that (in Italian), there are a few "unaccusative adjectives" like 'clear' and 'well-known' for which the NP argument is generated as a complement to A, rather than (on my analysis) in Spec, PredP. These adjectives also agree with their argument in number and gender but not person. See Baker 2008:67-74 for an analysis of the agreement properties of these adjectives, which does make crucial use of the distinction between A and the agreement-bearing functional head F A above it.
Note also that I am assuming that Pred itself is not a probe for agreement, at least in the languages under consideration. See Baker 2008:59-60 for a (somewhat inconclusive) discussion of the possibility of Pred bearing agreement (predictably for person as well as number and gender) with its subject in Nahuatl.
Finally, one must not permit A to move to Pred so as to become close enough to the subject that A can agree with the subject in person. I have assumed that A-to-Pred movement is possible in some languages, but the result is a verb, not an adjective (and verbs Fortunately, there is no deep problem here. I simply claim that Sakha is a language in which (some) Tense(s) can combine morphologically with adjectives as well as with verbs. The structure of (10) is (11), where a Tense node is generated above PredP. The adjective viewed as a syntactic entity still cannot agree in person with the subject, but Tense can:
Only when T fuses with the adjective does the adjective considered as a morphological word agree in person with the subject in Sakha. An implication of this is that in any syntactic context in which AP is not the first overt head below a tense node, no agreement will appear on the adjective. In particular, there is no agreement on attributive adjectives in Sakha ((12a)), nor on adjectives that are the complements of lexical verbs like 'make' or 'become' ((12b)), nor on adjectives that are in construction with an auxiliary verb ((12c)). In this last circumstance, Tense attaches to the auxiliary rather than to the adjective, and as a result person agreement is on the auxiliary but not on the adjective. The same ideas can be used to explain the two-and-a-half agreement phenomenon in double object constructions. A paradigmatic instance of this effect is in classical Nahuatl, as described by Launey (1981) . This language has six subject markers (three persons crossed with two numbers) and six object markers. On a normal monotransitive verb, the object markers express the person and number of the theme argument, as expected ( (13a)). However, on a ditransitive verb, these same object markers express features of the goal, not the theme argument ( (13b)). There is also the possibility of one additional morpheme, -im-. This -im-is included when the theme argument of the ditransitive verb is animate and plural, as shown in (13b,c). If the theme is singular, thenim-cannot be present, as shown in (13d).
(13) a. Xi-nēch-palēhui. Nahuatl (Launey 1981:82) There is clearly some degree of agreement between a ditransitive verb in Nahuatl and its animate theme object, as shown by the difference between (13c) and (13d). However, agreement with this object is not complete by Nahuatl's usual standards; the language generally allows for agreement with three distinct persons as well as two numbers, but it does not allow all these options in this case. (13b) bears witness to this, in that the first person singular prefix nēch cannot express that the theme argument is first singular, to give a meaning like 'Give me to someone'; nor is there any other morpheme to express this.
7 Nahuatl verbs thus do more than agree with two arguments, but they do less than agree fully with all three arguments. That is what I mean by "two-and-a-half" agreement.
Like the restriction on agreement on predicate adjectives, the restriction on agreement in double object constructions is crosslinguistically robust. For example, a very similar effect is found in Southern Tiwa, a Tanoan language of New Mexico. Like simple transitive verbs, ditransitives in this language can agree with any combination of subject and indirect/goal object. And they can do a little bit more: the relevant verb prefix also varies with the number and noun class of the second (theme) object. (14) shows that if we fix the subject as first singular and the goal as second singular, there are still three distinct agreement inflections that can appear on the verb. (14) a. Ka-'u'u-wia-ban. Southern Tiwa (Allen et al. 1990 ) 1sS/2sO/AO-baby-give-PAST 'I gave you the baby.' b. Kam-'u'u-wia-ban. 1sS/2sO/BO-baby-give-PAST 'I gave you the babies.'
c. Kow-keuap-wia-ban. 1sS/2sO/CO-shoe-give-PAST 'I gave you (the) shoes.'
The choice of ka-versus kam-versus kow-is determined by the number and gender of the theme argument (here incorporated into the verb). This is a form of agreement, but again it is partial agreement, since these are only three options, whereas there are many more options for (say) agreement with the subject argument. In particular, like Nahuatl, there are no forms for expressing a first or second person theme in the presence of a goal argument: (14a) cannot be interpreted as 'I will give you to the baby,' nor is there another verbal prefix that expresses this. Partial agreement in Southern Tiwa is a bit richer than in Nahuatl, in that Southern Tiwa has a gender system and the gender of the theme influences the verb from as well as its number. But it is still partial agreement, because first or second person features of the theme cannot be expressed on the verb. The two-and-a-half agreement effect is a special case of what is generally called in the literature the Person Case Constraint (PCC). This constraint is often presented in the following formulation, due to Bonet (1991:182) . (15) Context: Ditransitives with phonologically weak direct and indirect objects. Observation: If a direct and an indirect object co-occur, the direct object has to be 3 rd person (i.e., cannot be 1 st or 2 nd person).
The PCC is intended to apply to "weak" objects of three kinds: null pronouns licensed by agreement, pronouns cliticized to the verb, and phonologically reduced pronouns that stay in the argument position. The two-and-a-half agreement effect is the first of these three subcases.
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The two-and-a-half agreement effect can be explained in terms of the SCOPA if one assumes the following, quite standard structure for double object constructions, originally posited to explain the Barss-Lasnik c-command asymmetries (cf. Larson 1988) . (16) Partial structure of (13b) (Tense/Aspect projections above vP omitted)
In addition, let us assume that v is the locus of object agreement in Nahuatl (as usual; but see section 4 on Ostyak), and that this v has at most one EPP feature, triggering the movement of a single NP to its (second) specifier ("object shift"). Since the goal is higher than the theme argument in this structure, it is closer to v than the theme is; hence only the goal can be attracted to Spec, vP given normal assumptions about locality (Chomsky's 1995 Shortest Move) . Finally, I add the crucial assumption that in languages like Nahuatl and Southern Tiwa v is allowed to initiate agreement more than once (see also Anagnastopoulou 2003 , Nevins 2007 , and Rezac 2008 . The first goal for agreement is the closest NP to v, looking downward, namely the goal. Since the goal merges with vP, v can agree with it fully, in person as well as in number and gender. In contrast, the theme cannot move to Spec, vP, given my assumptions. The v head can still agree with it, since it is the next closest NP probing downward, but the agreement can only be at a distance. Agreement with the theme can thus be for number and gender, but not for person, by the SCOPA. Two-and-a-half agreement is thus possible, but not full three-way agreement in person, number, and gender. This accounts for the patterns in (13) and (14). Indeed, it does so without ad hoc assumptions about the feature content of the dative argument, such as those used by Anagnastopoulou, Rezac, and others to the effect that the dative NP has accessible person features but not accessible number features (see Baker 2008:88-89 for discussion).
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Putting together these two cases, then, it should be clear what double object constructions and adjectival constructions have in common syntactically on my analysis. In both constructions, 9 The guest editorial team points out that it is possible for both objects of a double object construction to undergo object shift in (for example) Scandinavian languages, with the result that both come before negation or a VP adverb (see, for example, Collins and Thrainsson 1996) . They also point out that one can have a direct object shift overtly while some other constituent inside VP undergoes wh-movement, and on standard assumptions about phases the wh-movement must also proceed via a position at the edge of the VP phase. The question, then, is what triggers these additional movements to vP, if not a second EPP feature on v? I do not have a complete answer to offer here. I can only conjecture that perhaps there are two kinds of movement to vP, one kind that is relevant to case and agreement relations (traditional A-movement) and one that is not (traditional A-bar movement). Suppose further that these two kinds of movement are triggered by different sorts of features on v. Then I could make my claim more precise by saying that v has only one feature that triggers A-type movement. It could have additional features that trigger A-bar type movement, but any positions created by such movement would be invisible for purposes of agreement. The matter certainly deserves more careful research, however. give turkeys [an, pl] the structure induced by the thematic properties of the lexical items involved makes it impossible for a certain NP to move so as to merge with the potentially agreeing head. The details as to why the movement is blocked are different: in the adjectival construction, movement would be downward; in the double object construction, movement is blocked by a closer potential mover. But the visible effect on agreement is similar: in both situations, the head in question cannot manifest agreement in person with the agreed-with NP.
Other structures in which only partial agreement is allowed
There is, of course, a simpler way of accounting for these facts: one can just say that they follow from properties of the morphological paradigms of the items in question. For example, it is clear that adjectives in Spanish take a different set of affixes than verbs do (-o, -a, -os, -as as opposed to -o, -s, -Ø, -mos, -ís, -n) . One could then say that it is a brute fact about the set of affixes that are available to attach to adjectives that it simply lacks any forms are sensitive to person features that an adjective might bear as a result of agreement. Similarly, one could say that the verbal paradigms in Nahuatl and Southern Tiwa simply lack forms that are sensitive to the person features of a third argument. Within this morphologically-oriented view, the reason why language after language has morphological paradigms with these qualities would presumably be explained functionally. For example, since a core use of adjectives is to modify nominals, and since first and second person nominals are rarely modified by an adjective, it might simply not be worth a language's while to bother with distinctive adjectival endings that manifest person agreement. Similarly, if a language had full agreement for all combinations of all three arguments of a ditransitive verb, it would need at least 6x6x6=216 different cells in its paradigms (assuming three persons and two numbers; there would be many more if the language distinguished a dual or made gender distinctions). That might simply be too many forms for language learners to learn reliably, especially since some of the more unusual combinations like 'she gave us to you' would rarely be used (cf. Haspelmath 2004) . This morphocentric approach needs only trivial grammatical machinery, and it can claim to be a partially unified solution inasmuch as both person agreement on adjectives and full three-way agreement on verbs might be seen as having little functional utility within a language. One can debate how insightful this approach is, and whether it does full justice to the strength of the phenomena crosslinguistically. But one cannot give a decisive empirical argument against it purely within these bounds.
So this is an excellent reason for expanding the bounds of the inquiry. I claim it as an important virtue of my syntactic account that, unlike a morphological account (or even many alternative syntactic theories), it generates clear expectations about other situations in which partial agreement will be found in languages of the world. In Baker 2008, I discussed three more such contexts of partial agreement. In this subsection I briefly review these three, before turning to two brand new cases in more detail. For each of these extensions, an account purely in terms of what is and is not included in a morphological paradigm is a nonstarter.
Agreement on T with Spec, CP
In certain nonstandard dialects of English discussed by Kimball and Aissen (1971) and Kayne (2000) , the finite verb can show agreement with a wh-phrase in Spec, CP rather than with the subject in Spec, TP. This happens only if the subject has default third person singular features. An example of such agreement is (17a). Here the form of the finite verb that would be expected in agreement with the subject Clark is thinks, but the form think is possible, agreeing with the whword who, which in turn agrees with the third person plural head of the relative clause, people. (17b) confirms that this is a form of agreement, not just the optional omission of a morpheme, because think is not possible when the wh-word is third person singular.
10 (17c) shows that suppletive plural agreement on be is possible in the same environment as the morphologically regular agreement on think, as one would probably expect. This is exactly what the SCOPA predicts. On standard assumptions, the relative operator never merges with a projection of T (nor does the head of the relative clause); rather it moves directly from some lower position to Spec, CP, giving (18). (18) We may assume (with Aisen, Kimball, and Kayne) that in the relevant English varieties the phifeatures of a third person singular subject NP may be left unspecified.
11 When that happens, T DP DP CP we DP C´ [1,pl] who
can agree with the more remote DP in Spec, CP without violating locality conditions involving intervention. However, it agrees with this DP at a distance. 12 Hence, it can only agree with it in number, not in person, by the SCOPA. This third context of partial agreement, superficially quite different from the first two, thus follows from the same principle plus standard assumptions about syntactic structure.
Notice that a proponent of a morphocentric approach could not say that (17e) is bad in English because the English verb be lacks a first person agreement form in its paradigm, since it obviously does have such a form. This must be a syntactic issue of where a form like am can be used, not a morphological issue of whether there is such a form. So (17e) should be ruled out syntactically, and the same syntactic principle can also account for partial agreement on adjectives and for the two-and-a-half agreement phenomenon. This then gives further credence to the claim that those are syntactic phenomena as well.
Agreement with the object in oblique subject constructions
A fourth case of partial agreement, much discussed in the recent literature, is the oblique subject construction in Icelandic. Icelandic has many verbs whose structural subject is marked with an oblique case specified by the particular verb-usually dative, but sometimes genitive or accusative. In such constructions, the finite verb cannot agree with its subject. If, however, the verb also selects an object argument, that object can appear in nominative case, and the finite verb can agree with it in number, as shown in (19a) T in these structures can only partially agree with the nominative object, although it can agree fully with the nominative subject of an ordinary verb like 'find' or 'catch'. In fact, examples like (19c) are more or less ineffable, at least for some speakers: they are deviant to some degree regardless of whether the verb bears first person plural agreement or third person plural agreement or default third person singular agreement. 13 person and singular in the lexicon. As a result, (17a) is bad with he in the place of Clark (see Kayne 2000:192 and den Dikken 2001 for other analyses of this effect). 12 Note that I do not assume that T moves to C in this structure, since if it did it might agree with Spec, CP in person locally from its derived position. This assumption is of course perfectly compatible with the fact that the finite verb remains after the subject in relative clauses in English. 13 See Sigurdsson and Holmberg 2008 for the most recent and nuanced discussion of this muchdiscussed effect. They identify significant dialectal variation in whether agreement-at-a-distance in number happens in sentences like (19a), and if so what the exact conditions on it are. This effect can also be attributed to the SCOPA. The structure of the sentences in (19) is, on standard accounts, (20) or some elaboration thereof. (20) Here the oblique case marked subject moves to Spec, TP, just as other subjects do in Icelandic. As a result, the oblique subject behaves like an ordinary nominative subject in nearly every syntactic respect (Zaenen et al. 1985) . But its quirky case prevents T from agreeing with it. T can probe for something else to agree with, lower in the structure, finding the object inside VP. But this is necessarily agreement at a distance, so it can be agreement in number (and gender, if the verb is a participle), but not in person, by the SCOPA. Similar restrictions on agreement are found in oblique subject constructions in Gujarati (Bhatt 2005) and Chicasaw (Baker 2008) , and in impersonal constructions in Italian (Taraldsen 1995) ; see also section 3.4 below for discussion of similar (but less sharp) facts in Sakha.
14 Again, the morphocentric approach clearly fails here, because Icelandic verb paradigms certainly do have first person plural forms; the problem is simply that these forms cannot be used in the particular syntactic environment in (20).
Agreement with NPs in an embedded clause (Long Distance Agreement)
However, they find essentially no variation in sentences like (19c), which are rejected with full agreement by all Icelandic speakers (except for instances in which first or second person agreement happens to be homophonous with the relevant third person agreement, a superficial morphological wrinkle that I take to be minor). The only time that agreement-at-a-distance systematically allows agreement in first or second person in Icelandic is in the so-called Reverse Predicate Agreement construction, where the subject is a featureless expletive or demonstrative and the predicate is a copular verb (e.g., the Icelandic version of 'It is only us'-more literally 'It are only we'). For a possible approach to this potentially problematic structure, see Baker 2008:89n.17. 14 The generality of this effect has been questioned in the literature, because examples parallel to (19c) are grammatical in quite a few languages, including German, Russian, Greek, Maithili, and Nepali. In Baker (2008) I tentatively followed Sigurdsson (2002) in saying that this difference is rooted in whether the dative argument is a true subject or not. In Icelandic, there is excellent evidence that it is, whereas the evidence is more mixed in Russian, Greek, German, etc. Suppose, then, that the dative subject occupies Spec, TP in Icelandic, but some other high position (possibly Spec, TopP) in some other languages. If so, then the Spec, TP position could be open for the nominative "object" to occupy at some point in the derivation in these other languages, and T could then agree in person with that argument. This conjecture still needs to be confirmed syntactically for all the relevant cases. Baker (2008:104) .
Nominalized gerundive verbs in Lokạạ are explicitly marked for a particular combination of number and gender (noun class 5), marked by the prefix ke-. In this respect, they are morphologically identical to a set of underived nouns in Lokạạ, such as ke-bạ 'squirrel'. When a gerundive verb occurs in the subject position and has no object of its own, the matrix verb(s) agree with it, also showing the class 5 prefix ke-:
Ke-paala (ke-tum) ke-tawa. GER/5-fly 5S-be.very 5S-be.difficult 'Flying is (very) difficult.' However, when the gerundive verb has an object, a kind of long distance agreement appears: the functional heads of the matrix clause must agree with the embedded object in number and gender, rather than with the gerundive verb:
7-fish GER/5-buy 7S-be.very 7S-be.difficult 'Buying fish is (very) difficult.' (*… ke-tum ke-tawa)
A plausible structure for an example like (22) is given in (23). Here I assume for concreteness that the stative verb 'be.difficult' is an unaccusative verb, and that agreement happens before the gerund raises to Spec, TP (other executions would also be possible). Note also that Lokạạ is normally a head initial language, but the object comes before the verb in negative and gerundive clauses. I assume that this is the result of the object-or some larger constituent that contains itmoving to Spec, GerP, as triggered by some feature of the Gerund head; see Baker 2005 for extensive discussion.
16 (The optional auxiliary verb is omitted in (23), for simplicity).
Exact structural details aside, the object clearly continues to be contained within the gerundive clause where it is theta-marked, because it moves as a unit with the gerund clause to Spec, TP.
(There is only one preverbal subject position in affirmative clauses in Lokạạ.) Hence, this is a genuine case of long distance agreement. The SCOPA then implies that agreement with the embedded object can be for number and gender but not for person; the embedded object simply cannot merge with the matrix T without first leaving GerP. We thus predict that there could not be similar long distance agreement with a first or second person pronoun. This is correct, as seen in an example like (24), which has the same structure as (23) but with 'me' replacing 'fish' and 'surprise' in the place of 'buy':
(24) *[Min ke-funna] n-tum n-tawa. me 5-surprise 1sS-be.very 1sS-be.difficult 'Surprising me is very difficult.' Once again, a purely morphocentric approach cannot duplicate this result, since there is clearly a first person singular prefix (n-) in Lokạạ, used whenever a first person pronoun is merged in Spec, TP. A similar limitation can be seen for one kind of apparent long distance agreement in Basque (Etxepare 2006:39) 17 An anonymous reviewer reminds me that Extepare's analysis of the relevant Basque construction is somewhat different. He claims that what looks like agreement on the matrix verb with the object of a nominalized embedded verb is really the result of the embedded clause inheriting a plural number feature from its absolutive case argument. The matrix verb then agrees with the nominalized clause as a whole in number, a purely local sort of agreement. In Extepare's terms , then, the ungrammaticality of a Basque example similar to (23) is due not to the SCOPA, but to the fact that a clause cannot inherit a first or second person feature from its object, but only a number feature.
Extepare's type of analysis is not very plausible for Lokạạ, because in Lokạạ the nominalized verb is explicitly marked for gender and number (class 5). If the gerund underwent a kind of agreement with its direct object so as to acquire phi-features from it, one would expect
To summarize, we see that a rather wide range of situations in which number and gender agreement is possible but person agreement is not can be unified under a single syntactic condition, the SCOPA. This approach is more general and arguably more insightful than piecemeal approaches that attribute similar effects to different causes-for example, the stipulation that adjectives do not have a slot for a person feature, or the idea that the paradigms of ditransitive verbs are impoverished in a certain way, or the idea that dative arguments are interveners for person agreement but not for number agreement.
Partial agreement on T in raising constructions
I now move from here into genuinely new territory, arguing that my approach can be extended even further, to novel instances of partial agreement that may be uncovered by ongoing linguistic research. To this end, I consider the Sakha language. Sakha is a Turkic language spoken in Siberia; like Turkish, it is an SOV language with nominative-accusative case marking, subject agreement on the verb, and extensive vowel harmony. Much general information on the language can be found in Vinokurova 2005 (NV in the example attributions below).
We saw in passing in section 2.1 that Sakha seems to have full agreement in predicate adjective constructions, rather than the partial agreement we might have expected. Balancing the scales, Vinokurova (2005) presents an interesting context where partial agreement does crop up in Sakha, where one would not necessarily anticipate it given familiar patterns in other languages. This is the fact that a finite verb can show partial agreement with the subject when the subject raises from an embedded clause. Let us consider in some detail what can be learned from this new case.
Description and basic analysis
One of the two major forms of clausal complementation in Sakha consists of a fully finite embedded verb, which can bear any of the possible tense inflections allowed in matrix clauses, followed by the invariant particle dien. Historically, dien is the nonfinite converb form of the verb die 'to say', but I assume that it has become a simple complementizer, similar to that in English. (25) c. En dössö daqany beje-ŋ kyaj-dy-ŋ dien san-yy-gyn. You still PRT self-2sS win-PAST-2sS that think-AOR-2sS 'You (singular) still think that you won.' to see the class 7 prefix e-on the gerund as well in (22). But this is impossible: the gerund is always marked as class 5.
It would be important to investigate more carefully which instances of putative long distance agreement are true instances of long distance agreement, and for which a reductive analysis like Extepare's might be suitable. This however goes beyond the bounds of this work. Theoretical concerns such as the Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC) (Chomsky 2000 , Chomsky 2001 ) imply that in order to be visible for accusative case assignment within the matrix clause, the embedded subject must move at least as high as adjoining to CP, so as to be at the edge of the CP phase. Word order evidence confirms this, in that accusative case marking on the embedded subject is only possible if the subject is at the left edge of the embedded clause. If the embedded subject is nominative, it can follow adverbs associated with the lower clause, as shown in (29). But the embedded subject cannot be case-marked accusative when it is unambiguously internal to the embedded clause in this way: Although it is not essential for current purposes, it is helpful to know more precisely how accusative case is assigned to the raised subject in examples like (28). The standard Chomskian view is that accusative case is assigned by a transitive v to some NP in its domain, as long as v and NP are available in the same phase. This standard view could work fine for examples like (28a) and (28b), where the matrix verb is transitive. But it is problematic for examples like (28c) and (28d), where the matrix verb is morphologically intransitive. These verbs are the unaccusative members of transitivity alternation pairs: xomoj 'become sad' as opposed to xomot 'make sad'; tönün 'return' as opposed to tönnör 'make return'. As such, they are about the last verbs one would expect to assign accusative case, and indeed they cannot assign accusative case in other contexts. Based on this and other data, Baker and Vinokurova (2010) argue at length that accusative case is not assigned by having an NP enter into a relationship with a particular functional head (transitive v) in Sakha, but rather is assigned on a configurational basis, in the manner pioneered by Marantz (1991) . More specifically, Baker and Vinokurova argue for the following case assignment rule:
If there are two distinct argumental NPs in the same phase such that NP1 c-commands NP2, then value the case feature of NP2 as accusative unless NP1 has already been marked for case.
In (28c) and (28d), raising the subject of the embedded clause to the edge of the embedded CP puts it in the same phase (the matrix CP phase) as the matrix subject, just as it does in (28a,b). Therefore, accusative case is assigned in the same way in all four examples, regardless of the differing lexical properties of the matrix verbs. The rule in (30) also accounts for the assignment of accusative case in passive clauses with covert agents in Sakha, in agentive nominalizations, and inside certain kinds of PPs-all contexts in which accusative case is not found in English and similar languages. For concreteness, I assume (30) in this article as well. (In contrast, Baker and Vinokurova (2010) argue that nominative case is assigned to an NP by way of an Agree relationship with a finite T, in the usual Chomskian way; it is not a freely available default case as in Marantz 1991. The case system of Sakha is thus something of a hybrid in this respect.) What is interesting about this type of subject raising for our purposes is its effect on agreement. The examples in (28) have full person-number agreement on the embedded verb, just as in (25). But Vinokurova (2005:361) These examples show that partial agreement is possible with first person pronouns as well as second person pronouns ((31c)), with singular pronouns as well as plural pronouns ((31d)), and with a wide range of verbs that take a CP complement. There is no clear truth conditional difference between the examples in (28) and the corresponding examples in (31), although there is a pragmatic difference, which Vinokurova describes in terms of speaker empathy: the form with full agreement shows empathy with the subject of the embedded clause, whereas the form with partial agreement expresses a sense of emotional detachment. I put this subtle pragmatic difference aside, tentatively assuming it to be irrelevant to the basic morphosyntax of the construction.
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Why should partial agreement on T be possible in Sakha in this situation and only in this situation? Clearly, no morphocentric solution is feasible. The phenomenon cannot be captured by saying that finite verbs in Sakha have an incomplete paradigm, since they certainly do not. Rather, this too must be a syntactic effect, having to do not with the features that can be realized on the finite verb, but with the grammatical relationship between the finite verb and its subject. The question, then, is whether the SCOPA can provide an account for this phenomenon as well as those in section 2.
In fact, the SCOPA does provide us with a way of thinking about this. Assume that the SCOPA is true. Normally the subject raises to Spec, TP in Sakha, where it merges with T and hence licenses full agreement on T. But the subject is clearly not in Spec, TP in the "raising to object" sentences in (31). Since it gets accusative case in the matrix, it must minimally be adjoined to CP, by the PIC (and perhaps higher). Suppose then that the subject can move to this 18 One might imagine that, in some or all of the examples in (28) and (31), the accusative casemarked NP is really a thematic ("proleptic") object of the matrix verb, not the raised subject of the embedded verb. There is empirical evidence that this alternative is a viable possibility for some examples with matrix verbs like 'think' and 'hear', but not for examples with unaccusative matrix verbs like 'become sad' and 'return'. Note that in English one can say I think of John that he will die' but not I returned of John because he will die. Suitable tests confirm that the thematic properties of the corresponding verbs in Sakha are similar.
Even for verbs like 'think' and 'hear', there is evidence that accusative case can be the result of raising the NP in question to the edge of the lower CP phase, rather than generating it as a proleptic object in the matrix clause. For example, one can observe contrasts like the following, when there is negation on the embedded verb and a negative polarity item is case-marked within the matrix clause: (i) *Min kim-ŋe daqany kel-bet dien et-ti-m I who-DAT PRT come-NEG.AOR.3sS that tell-PAST-1sS 'I told no one to come.' (lit. 'I told anyone that he should not come.') (ii)
Min kim-i daqany kyaj-ba-ta dien eren-e-bin. I who-ACC PRT win-NEG-PAST.3sS that hope-AOR-1sS 'I hope that nobody won (the lottery).' 'Who PRT' is a kind of negative polarity item, which can only be interpreted in the scope of negation. As a result, (i) is ungrammatical: the tellee is clearly an argument of the matrix verb, so it is in the matrix clause at all stages of the derivation, and thus is never in the scope of a licensing negation. If the accusative NP in (ii) were only analyzable as a proleptic object of the matrix verb, then (ii) should be ruled out on the same grounds as (i). But (ii) is fine. This shows that (ii) also has another derivation, in which 'who PRT' begins in the lower clause, raises to the edge of that clause where it is marked accusative, and then is reconstructed back under the scope of negation at LF. For reasons like this, I assume that all the examples in this section have a derivation in terms of NP-movement, although some of them may also have a derivation in which the accusative NP is originally merged in the matrix clause (see Vinokurova 2009 for more discussion of prolepsis in Sakha). position directly, from its thematic position in Spec, vP straight to CP, without moving through Spec, TP. (I return to why this is possible in section 3.3.) Then the NP never merges with a projection of T, and T can agree with it in number but not in person. The structure then is roughly the one shown in (32) (presented with head-initial order, for ease of reading). (32) It is not immediately obvious whether T agrees with the subject in its base position (Spec, vP), or in its higher, derived position. Either way, we expect partial agreement, given the SCOPA. If T agrees with DP in the high position, then the structure is rather like (18) in English; if T agrees with the NP in vP, then it is analogous to dative subject constructions like (20) in Icelandic. I assume for concreteness that T agrees with the copy of NP in Spec, vP; this seems like the more conservative hypothesis, and it may have certain technical advantages with respect to the syntax of Sakha that are not crucial here. 19 These advantages have to do with the details of case assignment (on which, see Baker and Vinokurova in press). There is independent reason to think that accusative case assignment bleeds agreement with T in Sakha. For example, the thematic object of a passive verb can bear accusative case in Sakha, but when it does, T cannot agree with it, but must be default third person singular, as shown by the contrast in (i) (see Sobin 1985 for a similar paradigm in Ukrainian). Of course, full agreement on the embedded verb is also possible in these subject raising structures, as shown in (28). This suggests that it is possible for NP to move through Spec, TP on its way to CP, although it is not required. When this derivation is chosen, T agrees with NP in person as well as in number, as usual.
A minimal contrast
Vinokurova 2005:361 also observes that subject raising from a tensed CP contrasts minimally with subject raising from a participial clause in Sakha. Sakha has two major forms of complementation: in addition to finite clauses headed by dien, many verbs can select a clause which is headed by a participial form of the verb (Sakha has past, present, and future participles, among others). In this form of complementation, an overt embedded subject normally has nominative case, the participial verb is inflected for possessor-type agreement rather than predicative agreement, there is no complementizer, and the clause as a whole is marked with accusative case. A typical example is: (33) Masha bügün ehigi massyyna atyylas-pyk-kyt-yn ihit-te. Masha today you car buy-PTPL-2pS-ACC hear-PAST.3sS 'Masha heard that you (plural) bought a car today.' These participial clauses are like finite CPs in that their subjects can raise to the edge of the clause and be marked accusative by virtue of being in the same domain as the matrix subject: (34) a. Masha ehigi-ni bügün massyyna atyylas-pyk-kyt-yn ihit-te. Masha you-ACC today car buy-PTPL-2pS-ACC hear-PAST.3sS 'Masha heard (of you) that you (plural) bought a car today.' b. Min kim-i daqany kyaj-bataq-yn ihit-ti-m I who-ACC PRT win-NEG.PTPL-3sP.ACC hear-PAST-1sS 'I heard that nobody won (the lottery).' (The fact that accusative case marking is possible even with a negative polarity item licensed by negation on the lower verb, as in (34b), shows that these examples must have an analysis in terms of subject raising; see footnote 18.) Interestingly though, Vinokurova observes that partial agreement is not possible with the subject when it has been raised from a participial clause. Thus, there is a rather surprising contrast between the grammatical examples in (31) and the bad example in (35).
(35) *Masha ehigi-ni bügün massyyna atyylas-pyt-tar-yn ihit-te. Masha you-ACC today car buy-PTPL-(3)pS-ACC hear-PAST.3sS 'Masha heard (of you) that you (plural) bought a car today.' 'The children were given horses.'
Once the embedded subject raises to the edge of the matrix clause in (32) , it gets accusative case. Depending on the exact sequence of steps in the derivation, this could prevent T from agreeing with the highest copy of the matrix subject, for the same reason that accusative case assignment blocks agreement in (ib). Saying that T agrees with the DP when it is in Spec, vP avoids this issue, because there is no possibility of that copy getting accusative case.
The SCOPA can explain this subtle difference, given independently motivated assumptions about the structure of participial clauses as opposed to finite CPs in Sakha. The vP in a finite clause is dominated by at least two functional heads, T and C. The higher head C is the phase head, while the lower head T is the agreement-bearing head, as shown in (32) . These are assumptions are perfectly standard, and quite close to the observable facts of Sakha. But the functional heads in a participial clause are clearly different. There is no clear sign of a complementizer in (33) or (34), and it is reasonable to say that here we have participle phrases, headed by -BYT (past) or -AR (aorist/present), rather than true TPs, headed by a morpheme like -DI (recent past).
We must also ask what head bears agreement in these constructions. In fact, within a broader perspective, the agreement properties of participles in Sakha are rather varied. Whereas the true tense marker -DI is always immediately followed by agreement from one fixed paradigm, this is not true for the participles in Sakha. Participles can appear as the predicates of matrix clauses, in which case they are followed by type I ("predicative") agreement, or they can appear as embedded clauses, in which case they are followed by type II ("possessive") agreement, or they can appear in relative clauses, in which case they cannot bear any agreement at all: read-AOR-2sS book 'the book that you read' As in Vinokurova (2009, 2010) , we take this to mean that participle heads themselves have no power to agree in Sakha; agreement surfaces on a participle only when it merges with a higher head that has well-defined agreement properties of its own. In (36a), that higher head is (null) present tense, which manifests Type I agreement. In (36c), there is no higher functional head, so there is no agreement. Most crucially for our purposes, in (36b) the higher head seems to be D (or something very much like it).
20 This D serves to make the participial phrase intrinsically nominal, so that it can receive a thematic role, stand in an argument position, and undergo case marking, as it does in (36b) and (33)-(34) (but not in (36a) or (36c)). This D also undergoes Type II agreement, manifesting the same kind of agreement with the subject that a possessive D shows with the possessor in simple nominal in Sakha (cf. kinige-ŋ 'book-2sP' your book). Given these assumptions, the structure of an example like (34a) is shown in (37). 20 The one salient way in which the functional head in participial complement clauses seems to be different from the D in possessive nominals is that it assigns nominative case to the subject of the clause, rather than genitive case. The difference is not very noticeable, because the exponents of genitive case have almost entirely been lost in Sakha (see B&V In press:xx). But this is why we refer to the head in question H rather than D in Baker and Vinokurova In press. (37) (37) is like (32) in that there are (at least) two inflectional heads that dominate the embedded vP: T and C in (32) ; Part and D in (37). The highest head (C or D) is a phase head in both cases, given that the constituent it heads is a complete and independent propositional unit (cf. Chomsky 2000) . But there is one crucial difference: in (32) it is the lower head T that is a probe agreement, whereas in (37) it is the higher head D that is a probe for agreement, as we have seen.
This small difference matters very much for the possibility of partial agreement. As before, given the PIC, a DP can only become visible for accusative case assignment inside the matrix clause if it first merges at the edge of the lower phase-CP in (32) and DP in (37). C is not a probe for agreement, so when the embedded subject adjoins to it there is no issue of C agreeing with the subject in person in Sakha. Moreover, by merging with CP, the subject can avoid merging directly with TP, and the result is partial agreement. But the PIC implies that there is no chance of avoiding merging with the DP projection in (37), if the subject is to get accusative case in the matrix CP phase. The embedded subject must merge with DP in (34), and the D head of DP is a probe for agreement. Therefore D inevitably agrees with the subject in person features as well as number and gender features, in accordance with the SCOPA. The SCOPA thus explains why partial agreement is possible with raised subjects of one kind of complement clause in Sakha, but not with the other kind. There are still some details about this theory to fill in, however. In particular, let us consider more carefully why partial agreement is possible when raising out of a finite CP but not (for example) in an ordinary matrix clause. Given the SCOPA, this reduces to the question of why the subject must move to Spec, TP in matrix clauses but not in some embedded clauses. Part of the reason could be the EPP feature associated with T: this must be suspended or satisfied in an alternative way in dien clauses with raising. That is plausible. Baker and Willie (2010) argue that in Ibibio only the highest head in the functional architecture of the clause has an EPP feature. The EPPbearing head can be T-but only if TP is present and is not embedded in something larger, like a MoodP. If there is no TP projection in a given clause, as in the "subjunctive" complements of a verb like 'want' in Ibibio, then the Aspect head has an EPP feature and the subject surfaces in Spec, AspP. If there is a Mood projection above TP, then Mood has an EPP feature rather than T, and the subject surfaces in Spec, MoodP. The result is that the subject is always before the verb, which raises to the highest tense-aspect-mood head in the clause, whatever that may be: The highest verbal functional head in an Ibibio clause has an EPP feature.
Something similar could be at work in Sakha. Some Cs have an EPP feature that allows an NP to move out of the interior of the embedded clause. When a C has this property, then the T below it need not. In contrast, T must have an EPP feature in matrix clauses, where there is no C, and in embedded clauses without raising, where C does not have an EPP feature. But additional evidence indicates that this is not the only factor. Suppose that the matrix predicate is an unaccusative or passive verb that selects a CP complement, but takes no other argument; in particular, it does not theta-mark a subject, as in (40). (40) a. Bügün [sarsyn ehigi kyaj-yax-xy dien] cuolkaj buolla. Today tomorrow you.PL win-FUT-2pS that ] clear become 'It became clear today that you (plural) will win tomorrow.' b. Beqehee [sarsyn ehigi kyaj-yax-xyt dien] iteqej-ili-ne.
b. Ehigi emiske massyyna-pyt/*-lara aldan-na.
(raised possessor) you suddenly car-2pP/*3pP break-PAST.3sS 'Your (plural) car suddenly broke down (on you).' yesterday tomorrow you.PL win-FUT-2pS that believe-PASS-PAST.3sS 'Yesterday it was believed that you (plural) would win tomorrow.'
The subject of the embedded clause can raise to the edge of CP, or even out of CP altogether in such constructions, just as it can when the matrix verb is transitive. This is shown by the position of the embedded subject with respect to matrix clause adverbs in examples like (41). Hence the embedded subject must merge with CP on its way out, by the PIC. We expect then that this should remove the EPP requirement from T, as before. But partial agreement on T is not possible here: (42) a. *Ehigi (bügün) [sarsyn kyaj-yax-tara dien] cuolkaj buolla. you-PL today tomorrow win-FUT-3pS that clear become 'It became clear (today) that you (plural) will win tomorrow.' b. **Ehigi (beqehee) [saryn kyaj-yax-tara dien] iteqej-ili-ne You.PL yesterday tomorrow win-FUT-3pS that believe-PASS-PAST.3sS 'It was believed (of you) (yesterday) that you (plural) would win tomorrow.' Why then are the examples in (42) ungrammatical?
The most salient difference between (42) and the grammatical examples in (31) has to do with case marking. In (31), where partial agreement is possible, the raised NP is marked accusative, whereas in (42) it appears unmarked for case. This is because the accusative case marking rule in (30) does not apply here: not only is the matrix verb an intransitive verb of the unaccusative class, but it is an impersonal predicate that does not select a thematic subject. There is thus no distinct argumental NP in the matrix clause that c-commands the raised subject. (If there is a null expletive pronoun, it does not count for (30) because it is not an argument.) Accusative case is thus not assigned to the raised subject in this structure. Either this NP gets nominative case in the matrix clause, or it is still dependent on the downstairs T for case. In fact, the downstairs T must fully agree with this NP, and the upstairs T cannot agree with it at all:
Oqo-lor (bügün) [beqehee kyaj-byt-*(tar)a dien] cuolkaj buolla-(*lar). child-PL today yesterday win-PAST-3(p)S that clear become-3pS 'Today it became clear that the children won yesterday.' 22 The passive version is somewhat degraded, because it is preferred to have 'you.PL' in accusative case. This is a reflex of rule (30), when a null agent is projected as the subject of the passive verb, as is possible in Sakha. See Vinokurova 2005:335-338 on the distinction between "syntactic passive" and "lexical passive" in Sakha, and Baker and Vinokurova In press for an analysis of this from the perspective of Case theory. When the null agent is syntactically present in the matrix clause and the raised subject is marked accusative, partial agreement with the raised subject on the embedded T is possible, as expected.
That suggests that the raised subjects in (42) are in fact still dependent on the downstairs T for nominative case assignment. Suppose then that we posit the principle in (44), which is essentially the same as one adopted by Anagnostopoulou (2003) and especially by Rezac (2008) in their work on the PCC effect proper:
F values the case feature of DP only if F agrees with all DP's marked features.
(44) together with the Case filter implies that partial agreement is allowed only if there is another source of case for the agreed-with NP. There is another source ( (30)) if the matrix verb is transitive, but not otherwise. 24 When there is no alternative source, NP needs to get case from T, so T needs to fully agree with NP, by (44). In the case of a first or second person DP, this implies that DP must move to Spec, TP, given the SCOPA. It follows that partial agreement will never be permitted in a matrix clause or in an embedded clause without subject raising, regardless of whether there needs to be an EPP feature on T or not.
On the variable effability of partial agreement
The contrast between (31) and (42) leads us to adopt the relationship between partial agreement and case assignment stated in (44). But this principle could have a much more general importance within my set of assumptions. In particular, it has the potential to explain why the SCOPA seems to enforce partial agreement in some structures while it rules out others entirelya problem that I had no solution to in Baker 2008. To see this, let us first consider dative subject constructions, like the ones in Icelandic discussed in section 2.4.2. Somewhat similar dative subject constructions exist in Sakha as well. Sakha does not have as rich a variety of oblique subject constructions as Icelandic does, but it does have two kinds. First, it has some dyadic predicates (verbs and adjectives) of possession that take dative higher arguments and nominative complements, including 'have', 'need', and 'lack'. Second, it can form dative subject predicates by passivizing a ditransitive verb like 'give' or 'send'; as in Icelandic, the goal argument of such a verb can behave like its subject. One example of each kind is given in (45). 23 Rezac (2008:69) builds (44) (44) adds to this is the hunch that the reason why 1 st and 2 nd person features behave differently from third in this respect is that they are more marked (not necessarily that 3 rd person is entirely unspecified; cf. Nevins 2007) .
As a somewhat more distant intellectual relationship, there is also a significant similarity between (44) and Chomsky's (2000 Chomsky's ( :124, 2001 :6-7) idea that adjectives and participles do not value the case feature of a DP because they are not "phi-complete", and hence do not agree fully with the DP. However, the specifics are rather different. In Chomsky's conception, the ultimate source of phi-incompleteness is the lexical representation of the nonverbal category, whereas for me it is syntactic in nature, induced by the SCOPA. Also, (44) allows a partially agreeing head to case mark a third person DP, whereas Chomsky's execution does not. This is crucial for examples like (45) versus (46). 24 We should ask why the subject cannot get nominative from the matrix T, thereby agreeing with it, in a sentence like (43). The simplest answer to this (pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer) is to say that predicates like 'become clear' must have null 'it'-type expletive subjects. The matrix T must then agree with this expletive as the closest constituent that bears phi-features (third person singular). See also Baker and Vinokurova In press for additional considerations, including some that would not necessarily depend on positing a null expletive in this example. (45) a. Ucuutal-ga student-nar tiij-bet-ter. Teacher-DAT student-PL suffice-NEG.AOR-3pS 'The teacher doesn't have enough students.' b. Masha-qa oqo-lor/?kini-ler yyt-ylyn-ny-lar. Masha-DAT child-PL/them-PL send-PASS-PAST-3pS 'Masha was sent children/them.'
Evidence that these are some sort of dative subject construction comes from the fact that the dative argument acts like it c-commands the object for purposes of anaphor binding and weak crossover. Dative subject constructions also have some distinctive behaviors in relative clauses when the dative argument is extracted (see Baker and Vinokurova 2010 for some examples and discussion).
The examples in (45) also show that the finite verb may-indeed must-agree with the nominative object in number in dative subject constructions in Sakha, as in Icelandic. The question then is what happens when the nominative object is a first or second person pronoun. The answer is that such examples sound awkward and distinctly odd, especially when presented in a simple sentence out of the blue: These examples have full person agreement with the nominative argument. Their less-than-full acceptability suggests a SCOPA account, just like the one offered for Icelandic in section 2.3.2. The reason that they are not completely out, I claim, is because they can actually have two distinct syntactic structures. The pragmatically simplest structure for a clause containing 'not suffice' or 'be sent' in Sakha is one in which the Dative NP, which is the highest argument in VP, satisfies the EPP feature of T, the nominative NP staying inside VP. This structure is perfectly fine in any context if the theme is third person, singular or plural. T then agrees with the theme at a distance, as is allowed by the SCOPA, and can thus value its case as nominative according to (44). However, this pragmatically neutral structure is ruled out when there is a first or second person pronoun in the object position, as a violation of the SCOPA. There is also a second, pragmatically more marked structure that is available in some contexts. In this structure, the theme moves to Spec, TP, past the goal/experiencer. If this applies to a sentence like (46b), the result is a fully acceptable structure, having full person-number agreement with the nominative 25 Example (46a) is fine with the irrelevant reading 'We don't reach the teacher'. The verbs 'reach' and 'suffice' are homophonous in Sakha (and presumably historically related), but 'reach' acts like it has a nominative subject and a dative object with respect to the relevant syntactic tests, whereas the dative argument acts like the higher argument with 'suffice'.
(46b) becomes grammatical if the theme is marked with accusative case, and hence T may not (and cannot) agree with it: Masha-qa ehigi-ni yyt-ylyn-na, Masha-DAT you,PL-ACC send-PASS-PAST.3sS (see notes 19 and 22).
argument, now in Spec, TP (Ehigi Masha-qa yyt-ylyn-ny-gyt 'You were sent (to) Masha'). 26 The goal/experiencer then can optionally front to the left-periphery in this derived structure to get a topic-like reading. Such pragmatically-driven movements are known to be possible in Sakha, given that the language has a certain amount of scrambling/free word order even in nominative subject constructions, as is often true in head-final languages (cf. Vinokurova 2005:211) . Thus, (46b) is more or less acceptable, but a particular discourse context is required to get it. (I have not investigated exactly what the pragmatic factors are that facilitate this alternative parse of the sentence.)
Now the interesting fact for issues of ineffability is that the examples in (46) become worse rather than better when the finite verb bears partial agreement: (47) a. *Ucuutal-ga bihigi tiij-bet-ter. Teacher-DAT we.NOM suffice-NEG-AOR-3pS 'The teacher misses/doesn't have enough of us.' b. *Masha-qa ehigi yyt-ylyn-ny-lar Masha-DAT you.PL.NOM send-PASS-PAST-3pS 'Masha was sent you.' Why should this be, given that there is no SCOPA violation here? Principle (44) Partial agreement with the non-dative argument of a dative subject predicate is tolerated in Sakha under one known condition: it is possible when that argument raises into a higher clause, so that it is case-marked accusative by (30). Then it is not dependent on T for case, (44) is not relevant, and partial agreement is allowed, as in (48). (48) Min ehigi-ni biligin [Masha-qa yyt-yll-yax-tara dien] eren-e-bin. I you.PL-ACC now Masha-DAT send-PASS-FUT-3pS that hope-AOR-1sS 'I now hope (about you) that Masha will be sent you.' 26 See Rezac 2008 for detailed discussion of similar derivations in Basque and other languages. In Basque, the SCOPA-satisfying movement of the theme argument to Spec, TP is particularly striking because of Basque's morphological ergativity. A first or second person theme argument in Spec, TP gets ergative case in Basque, in contrast to a third person NP, which is allowed to stay in VP and still get absolutive case under agreement at a distance, as permitted by (44). 27 In contrast, Sigurdsson and Holmberg (2008) report that the Icelandic analogues of (47) with partial agreement, although not great, are noticeable improvements over the analogues of (46) (?* as opposed to *). Examples with default third person singular agreement are better still (?), especially in varieties that are more restrictive about agreement at a distance. In part, this difference could follow from the well-known fact that dative NPs make particularly good subjects in Icelandic, as contrasted with most other languages. This suggests that the dative subject sits perfectly comfortably in the Spec, TP position in Icelandic, completely blocking the structurally lower nominative NP from moving there (see Rezac 2008:89-93) . Hence the derivation suggested for (46) when it is acceptable in Sakha is blocked in Icelandic. This pattern of judgments also implies that there is a source of nominative case in Icelandic other than agreement with T, whereas there is not in Sakha. Perhaps nominative case is rather freely available as a default case in Icelandic (cf. Marantz 1991) whereas it clearly is not in Sakha (Baker and Vinokurova In press ).
In contrast, if the dative subject is raised into the matrix clause, partial agreement with the nondative argument remains bad, as shown in (49). (49) *Min Masha-qa biligin [ehigi yyt-yll-yax-tara dien] eren-e-bin. I Masha-DAT now you.NOM send-PASS-FUT-3pS that hope-AOR-1sS 'I now hope (about Masha) that Masha will be sent you. ' (grammatical with yyt-yll-yax-xyt (2pS) instead of yyt-yll-yax-tara) This contrast reconfirms our conclusion that the case needs of a DP play a crucial role in determining when partial agreement with that DP is possible. It is not that any raising out of an embedded clause takes away the need of that clause's T to show full agreement (say by removing its EPP property). If that were true, then (48) and (49) should be on a par. Rather, raising only facilitates partial agreement if it is the partially-agreed with DP itself that is raised, to a position where it can get case. Principle (44) tells us why.
Can (44) be used more generally to explain why sometimes languages tolerate partial agreement with a first or second person nominal and sometimes they do not? It seems promising. Contrast the reduced grammaticality of (47a,b) and (19c) with the most obvious situation in which partial agreement is allowed, namely on predicate adjectives in examples like (50) in Spanish and the equivalents in Swahili. (50) Nosotras somos gord-as. we.F.PL are.1pS fat-F.PL 'We are fat.' Principle (44) bids us ask how the subject gets case here. It stipulates that the subject cannot get case from the adjective, since the adjective does not agree with the subject's marked first person feature. But that is no hardship for the subject in this structure, since adjectives are not sources of structural case anyway. Moreover, there is another obvious source of case for the subject, namely the finite T realized on the copular verb. Thus, principle (44) draws the right line between the effable and the ineffable in these clear cases.
Consider next the fact that partial agreement is tolerated between a T and a first person plural expression in Spec, CP in nonstandard English (we who Clark are hoping will come; see (17)). (44) implies that T cannot accomplish case licensing for the relative pronoun in this construction. But that is fine: either operators in A-bar positions do not need case at all, or they inherit case from the variable position inside the clause that they move from. Either way, the relative pronoun does not depend on T for case marking, so partial agreement is tolerated.
In contrast, consider the theme object of a double object construction. These NPs have no obvious source of case other than the v that they partially agree with. If the theme NP is third person, SCOPA-compliant agreement in number could be enough for the v to value the NP's case feature, plural being the only marked feature of such an NP. But if the theme NP is first or second person, the structure is in trouble. The v head cannot agree fully with the theme, by the SCOPA, nor can it agree partially with the theme, because then it would not assign it case, leading to a violation of the Case filter. Such structures are therefore ineffable; speakers must find some other way to communicate this sort of proposition in languages in which case assignment is related to object agreement. Again, (44) draws the right line between the effable and the ineffable. It thus addresses a major gap in the theory of agreement proposed in Baker 2008. 28 28 The one major instance of partial agreement that I have not revisited in these terms is long distance agreement. In Baker (2008) , I reported (on the basis of limited data) that the Lokaa LDA Object agreement is thus partial agreement in Northern Ostyak.
29 This is somewhat surprising, because full person-number agreement is allowed with the object in many other languages, including Nahuatl and Southern Tiwa. One might think, then, that this must be a language specific paradigmatic effect, where the language simply does not have more than these three vocabulary items for spelling out the object agreement morpheme. Yet I claim that this pattern too can be attributed to the SCOPA.
The key to understanding the partial nature of object agreement in Northern Ostyak is, I claim, realizing that the host of this agreement is T, not v, as usually assumed for object agreement in other languages (see, for example, (16) in Nahuatl). One sign of this is that the object agreement morpheme in Ostyak is outside of the tense morpheme, further from the verb root than T, not inside it, adjacent to the verb root. Morphological structure is not a perfect guide to syntactic relationships, but they are heavily correlated (Baker 1985) . For example, the morphological structure of the Chichewa verb is [[AgrS+T] [AgrO+Verb]] consistent with the normal Chomskian idea that T agrees with the subject and the verb (more precisely, v) agrees with the object (Mchombo 2004) . Similarly, the morphological structure of the Mapudungun verb is [Verb-AgrO-Mood-AgrS] (Smeets 2008) , the opposite linear order, but the same constituent structure. In contrast to these "normal" languages, the morphological structure in Ostyak is [Verb-T+AgrO+AgrS] , as is evident in (51) and (52). This makes sense if object agreement in Ostyak is really a second set of phi-features on T, rather than a set of phi-features on a distinct lower head such as v.
More evidence for this hypothesis comes from nonfinite clauses. Nonfinite verbs have an invariant suffix -ti or -ta, depending on the variety. Such verbs do not agree with their understood subject, as expected-but neither do they agree with the object. There is, for example, no agreement on the infinitive with the definite object in (53).
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29 Note that the Eastern Ostyak described in Gulya 1966 is different in this respect: it shows agreement with the object in number in the equivalent of (51), but not in the equivalent of (52). Perhaps correlated with this difference is the striking fact that the overt accusative case suffixes on pronouns are not cognate in the two varieties of Ostyak: Northern Ostyak has forms that vary with the person and number of the pronoun itself (Rédei 1965:49) , whereas Eastern Ostyak pronouns bear an invariant suffix -t (Gulya 1966:75) . One might relate these two differences by saying that the -t suffix in Eastern Ostyak is formally a postposition, which renders its object inaccessible to agreement (compare the ergative postposition ne and the accusative postposition ko in Hindi). In any case, Eastern Ostyak is only indirectly relevant here. Agreement in Hungarian is also similar to agreement in Ostyak in important ways, as the guest editorial team reminds me. In particular, agreement with the object in Hungarian is greatly impoverished compared to agreement with the subject, which shows full person and number inflection (see Kiss 2002:49-55 and den Dikken 2004 among many others). Indeed, object agreement in Hungarian does not even vary for the number of the object, but only records whether the object is definite or not. Since it is not so clear (to me) whether definiteness is to be treated as a simple phi-feature on a par with number, gender, and person, I put the Hungarian case aside. Since Northern Ostyak shows number agreement with the object-an undoubted instance of a phi-feature-it is more obviously comparable with agreement on adjectives or agreement with the second object of a ditransitive verb in Nahuatl or Southern Tiwa. 30 Ostyak is also different in this respect from Chichewa and Mapudungun, in which a nonfinite verb can perfectly well bear object agreement, just as finite verbs do.
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A third line of evidence that object agreement is on T in Ostyak is a bit more complex and theory internal. As mentioned above, agreement with the object happens in Ostyak if and only if the object is definite or topical in some sense. Thus both of the following are possible, with somewhat different pragmatics (Nikolaeva 2001) : (54) a. ma tăm kălaŋ wel-s-əm (no agreement with object) I this reindeer kill-PAST-1sS 'I killed this reindeer.' b. ma tăm kălaŋ wel-s-Ø-em (agreement with object in number) I this reindeer kill-PAST-sO-1sS 'I killed this reindeer.'
In (54a), the transitive verb has the same 1sS marking that the intransitive verb has (see (51a)), with no indication that there is an object present. Nikolaeva (1999 Nikolaeva ( , 2001 ) discusses at length the pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic aspects of this alternation. She concludes that the (54b) form is the result of moving the object out of VP, so that it receives a strong reading, as in Diesing 1992 and related work. Word order evidence for this is found when there is something other than the object inside the verb phrase. When the order is S-X-O-V, the majority of examples do not have object agreement on the verb (39 without, only 14 with); when the order is S-O-X-V, the majority of examples do have object agreement on the verb (155 with, only 35 without). This is illustrated in (55). Moreover, if the object appears before the subject or after the verb, and hence is unambiguously not in the VP, it is agreed with in every case (10/10 and 7/7). Nikolaeva (1999:344) also shows 31 My claim here is only a one way conditional: if agreement with the object is agreement on finite T in a given language, then one repercussion of this will be that there will be no agreement with the object in nonfinite clauses. However, there could very well be other causes that yield the same effect. For example, there is no object agreement (or dative agreement ) in nonfinite/nominalized clauses in Basque either, even though there is good reason to believe that distinct functional heads agree with the subject and the object in Basque. It is perfectly consistent to say that different heads agree with the subject and the object in Basque, but both heads happen to be missing in a nonfinite/nominalized clauses. Data like (53) are thus enough to raise the serious possibility that object agreement is agreement on T in a given language, but they are not enough to establish this all by themselves. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for initiating discussion of this point.)
that an agreed-with object can bind a reflexive pronoun possessing the X element, whereas an unagreed with object cannot: (56) a. Iltam sărt kŭtpe-l ewəlt mŭw-na lăskә-s-li. this pike middle-3s from ground-LOC throw-PAST-sO.3sS 'He threw this pike to the ground from its (the pike's) middle.' b. Aśi xot-əl-na pǒx-əl want-əs Father house-3s-LOC son-3s see-PAST.3sS 'The father saw his son at his (father, *son's) house.' Finally, nonreferential/nonspecific indefinite NPs, which must be interpreted inside VP under Diesing's assumptions, cannot be agreed with (Nikolaeva 2001:21) : (57) ma mola/ne:məltit an wa:n-s-əm/*wa:n-s-e:m. I what/nothing NEG see-PAST-1sS/see-PAST-sO-1sS 'I saw something/I didn't see anything.'
There is thus converging evidence that the object is agreed with in Ostyak if and only if it has moved out of VP, with consequences for syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
Why should this be? This requirement that the object must leave VP in order to be agreed with is definitely not universal; Nahuatl verbs, for example, show exactly the same agreement with the object whether it is an indefinite NP that is inside VP or a definite NP that is outside VP (see Baker 2008:301) . I propose that this condition in Ostyak is a reflex of agreement being on T. If NP stays inside the VP/vP phase, then T cannot agree with it, by the PIC. Only if the NP shifts to the edge of VP or outside VP altogether can T agree with it. In contrast, if agreement with the object is on v in Nahuatl, as in Bantu and Mapudungun, then there is no phase boundary between the bearer of object agreement and the object itself, and thus no need for the object to undergo object shift in order to be agreed with. The fact that there is such a need in Ostyak, then, coheres with the claim that object agreement is a second agreement on T. 32 We thus have three reasons to think that object agreement is on T in Ostyak, rather than on v.
Given this, that there would be a language like Northern Ostyak was actually predicted (without much confidence) in Baker 2008:100-101. This prediction emerged out of my analysis of two-and-a-half agreement in Nahuatl and Southern Tiwa. The claim is that v in those languages agrees (to some degree) with two NPs. It thus stands to reason that T could potentially also do this in some language. Specifically, a form of one-and-a-half agreement should arise in a language that has the following set of properties:
(58) (i) T is the locus of subject agreement (as usual) (ii) v is inactive for (overt) agreement (as in most IE languages) (iii) T has one EPP feature, triggering movement of one NP to its Spec (as usual) (iv) The subject is higher in vP than the object (as usual).
(v) T is allowed to agree more than once (like v in Nahuatl, S.Tiwa) A language with these properties should show full person-number agreement with the subject and partial agreement, in number (and perhaps gender) only, with the direct object, agreement with the object probably being contingent on the object moving out of the VP phase. This gives the analysis in (59) for an example like (52b) in Ostyak.
Other approaches to the PCC do not predict that a language like Northern Ostyak would exist. For example, Nevins (2007:290) explicitly states that his theory is designed to capture the fact that there are PCC-type interactions between direct and indirect objects, but no such interactions between subjects and objects. 34 The one promising alternative account is the morphocentric one, in which one simply says that it is a fact about morphological paradigms in Ostyak that they do not provide different agreement forms for different choices of person on the direct object. That alternative is descriptively adequate, but it is not really explanatorily leading idea; future work will have to sort out which of these specific proposals are consistent with each other and which are not. [1,pl] adequate. It can account for the pattern in Ostyak because it can account for essentially any pattern, unless further restrictions of some kind are added. That is not true of the SCOPA-based account. For example, my account predicts that there could not be a language that showed full person-number-gender agreement with the object of a transitive verb, but only number-gender agreement with the subject of that verb-the opposite of Ostyak. Given the SCOPA, this Reverse Ostyak pattern would arise in a language in which the object systematically moves to Spec, TP to check the EPP feature of T instead of the subject, thereby creating the syntactic configuration in which T would agree fully with the object and partially with the subject. But it is likely that there would be no such language: since the subject is closer to T than the object is, it should always be at least possible for the subject to move to Spec, TP, maybe required. 35 And, as far as I know, there is no language that meets the description of Reverse Ostyak. My account also predicts that this restriction on object agreement should only arise in a language in which there is independent evidence that it is T that agrees with the object (as well as the subject), not a distinct head v. That is also true, as far as I know. Hence, my theory is stronger and more explanatorily adequate than a purely morphological alternative.
I conclude that, far from being a problem for the SCOPA, Northern Ostyak has a coherent analysis within my system. Indeed, the assumptions of Baker 2008 predicted that such languages should exist, although I had no clear cases to offer at the time.
Effability and partial agreement in Ostyak
Finally, what can we learn from this last case study about the ineffability issue? Note that partial agreement with a first or second person object in Northern Ostyak is clearly effable. In other words, one-and-a-half agreement does not rule out there being a first or second person direct object, even though two-and-a-half agreement does usually rule out there being a first or second person second object (theme). Why should this be?
The proposal arising out of the study of partial agreement in Sakha is that partial agreement is tolerated only if there is another way for the partially agreed with NP to get case. Is that true for objects in Northern Ostyak? The answer is perhaps yes. As alluded to in section 3.1, the literature proposes two distinct ways that an object might be assigned accusative case. One is the familiar Chomskian way, in which the functional head v assigns case to the closest NP by entering into an agreement relationship with it. The other is by configurational rule, where accusative case is assigned to an NP when it is c-commanded by another NP within the same phase. Baker and Vinokurova (2010) argue that these two modalities of case assignment can coexist, not only in Universal Grammar, but even in the grammar of a particular language. More specifically, we argue that nominative case in Sakha is assigned by T via an agreement relation, whereas accusative case in Sakha is assigned configurationally, as stated in (30). Suppose that Northern Ostyak also uses this configurational modality of assigning accusative case. Then we expect partial agreement with the object to be tolerated, without leading to ungrammaticality. The SCOPA implies that T cannot agree fully with the object, (44) then implies that T cannot value the case of a first or second person object, but no Case filter violation results, because the object is case marked apart from T by a rule like (30).
Unfortunately, I do not have any conclusive independent evidence that (30) is how accusative case is assigned in Northern Ostyak; I simply do not know enough about the details of the language to discern this one way or the other. On the positive side, I do not know anything against this analysis, either. Accusative case on pronoun objects is morphologically distinct from the nominative case seen on subjects. If we say that nominative case is (sometimes) assigned by T to the NP it agrees with, then it is at least odd to say that T assigns accusative case to an NP it agrees with in other circumstances. Also relevant is the behavior of nonfinite clauses in Ostyak, in which there is no agreeing T. Such clauses generally have an obligatory controlled subject, or a oblique subject (Gulya 1966:124) . This is what we expect if nominative case comes from agreement with finite T. However, such clauses can have a pronominal object in accusative case: (60) …iγ-nə män-t nuγ-li-tə taγi əntə wu-ta-ma bear-LOC me-ACC up-eat-GER
POST not see-INF-CASE? (I lie down…) so as not to see the bear devouring me. (Gulya 1966:137) This strongly suggests that accusative case on the object does not come from the finite agreeing T in Ostyak, but rather from some other source. 36 If that is true, then T is free to partially agree with the object; there is no risk of a violation of the Case filter despite the limitation imposed by (44). Hence, structures with first or second person direct objects are effable in Ostyak.
In contrast, it might be true that only languages with (some) clear case particles have configurationally assigned case. If so, there will be no possibility of the theme argument of a ditransitive verb being assigned case configurationally in languages like Nahuatl and Southern Tiwa, neither of which has any overt case morphology. This then can partially account for why first or second person theme objects are ineffable in double object constructions in those languages. Over all, then, it still seems like (44) can draw the right line between when partial agreement is tolerated and when it is not.
Conclusion
In the course of this paper, I have discussed seven contexts in which a particular syntactic head can agree with a noun in number and gender (if any), but not in person. Some of these contexts are very robust crosslinguistically, perhaps even universal, including agreement on adjectives, and agreement with the theme argument of a double object construction. Others are of unknown or intermediate generality, such as agreement with the object in an oblique subject construction and long distance agreement with a nominal contained in an embedded clause. Still others seem very language particular, including the verb agreeing with a wh-phrase in Spec, CP in some substandard dialects of English, the verb agreeing with a subject that has raised out of its clause in Sakha, and T agreeing with a topical object in Northern Ostyak. Despite the great superficial diversity of these constructions, I have shown that, given other independently motivated assumptions about the syntactic structures, they can be given a unified explanation under the single idea that agreement in person is possible only if the agreed-with nominal merges directly with some projection of the agreeing head (the SCOPA). In general, I believe that other important theories of agreement are unable to match the generality of this approach. Finally, I added the claim that a head can only assign case to a noun phrase if it agrees with all the marked features of the noun phrase. This principle can explain why, when full agreement is blocked by the SCOPA, partial agreement is sometimes tolerated and sometimes not. One of the broadest lessons of the study is, I claim, that syntactic factors play a large role in determining how agreement works-not only at the gross level as to whether agreement is possible at all, but also at a finer level, accounting for the different distributions of one kind of agreement as opposed to another.
